The massive hype over "big data" during the past several election cycles, not to mention in the world at large, is finally being revealed as nonsense. Nassim Taleb has been the only major voice calling the whole approach bullshit, although he hasn't focused so much on the Trump phenomenon.
This election shows the fatal flaw of the big data program -- like all statistical learning programs, it has absolutely no clue what answer to give when it encounters an entirely unfamiliar environment. Maybe it'll give the right answer, and maybe it'll give a wrong answer -- whatever it says, our only rational response is to ignore it and look elsewhere, if anywhere, for answers.
Take an example: the 538 blog of poser quants tells us that, historically, the eventual Presidential nominee for a party had already done very well in opinion polls with the electorate, had amassed huge amounts of funds from donors, and/or had racked up scores of endorsements from politicians.
With Trump dominating the polls -- and media coverage -- while raising very little funds from donors and receiving no endorsements from major politicians, science says he can't win. Or at least, his chances are way below Fiorina, who they were "bullish" on after the second GOP debate, compared to their "bearish" stance on the master.
What the spergs can't see is that Trump is unlike anything in the data-set that they've honed their intuitions on. We haven't seen something like him since Teddy Roosevelt, but nerds generally don't appreciate history, and cannot force themselves to think back further than WWII, and typically 1980 in politics. Sure enough, 538's graphs on the "history" of endorsements for candidates only goes back to 1980.
Simply put, if there's no similar event to the Trump phenomenon in their history, why consult the history at all? It's like asking someone who's been trained on conjugating Spanish verbs to weigh in on how some verb is conjugated in Chinese. [1]
This whole situation brings up one of the central topics of statistical inference -- making a prediction based on interpolation vs. extrapolation.
With interpolation, you're making a guess about an item that lies within the range of what you've already seen, even if you haven't seen that exact item before. Nobody has any major objections to making these kinds of predictions, if you've got a dense enough data-set that will reveal how things behave within that range. You're mapping out a tiny square-inch within a territory that has been extensively surveyed for a mile around it.
With extrapolation, you're making a prediction about an item that lies well outside of the range that your data-set lies in. Honest folks view extrapolation as bogus -- not that the prediction is bound to be wrong, but that there's no reason to pay any heed to a guess that has no basis or grounding in the data-set. You are now sailing into uncharted waters, and assuming that the patterns of a territory you explored earlier will continue to apply in this unexplored territory. What could go wrong with assuming that the same pattern holds true everywhere?
For example, let's say there are two variables X and Y -- I promise, even innumerate people can get this -- like you remember from graphing equations in algebra class. Suppose you have a huge data-set -- thousands of points on the graph, revealing the fine-grained shape of the relationship between the two. Sample points -- (1,2), (2,4), (3,6), (1.1, 2.2), (2.1, 4.2), (3.1, 6.2), etc., all clearly suggesting that the Y value is 2 times the X value.
But what if the points in your data-set only had positive X values? Well, it might not present an obstacle if you're asked to predict what Y value will go with an X value of 2.5 -- supposing you hadn't already been given that point, you'd guess pretty safely that it would be 5, fitting with the rest of the multitude of points around it, and that Y would be 2 times X here as well.
However, if you were thrown a curveball, like X being a negative number, say -10, you wouldn't really know what to predict for the Y value anymore. Points with a negative value for X are outside of the data-set that you're drawing an association from, so you'd have no basis for a good guess. Maybe it'll continue the pattern from the points with positive X values, and Y will be -20. Then again maybe there's an absolute value function at work, making the magnitude the same but always giving a positive Y value, in this case X = -10 and Y = 20. Or any other of an infinite number of imaginable behaviors in this environment that you have no previous information about.
In such an unfamiliar territory, your guess is as good as any. Maybe it'll turn out right, maybe wrong, but you'll have no basis on those thousands of points of "big data" for your guess. If you do guess correctly, it will only be pure dumb luck, and nobody should pay any heed to your guess in the meantime.
How does extrapolation confuse people in an election like this one, with a never-before-seen candidate like Trump?
Lazy people have likened Trump to Perot, particularly if he decides to run on a third party. They try to analogize from the Perot phenomenon and conclude that Trump has little chance of winning the GOP nomination, and would crash and burn as a third party candidate.
But Perot had zippo in the polls, let alone was he dominating the GOP polls by double digits for more or less the entire time, and increasing more or less steadily all the while. He wasn't given wall-to-wall media coverage, and did not consistently draw crowds in the thousands and even tens of thousands. And he was a complete unknown before the election, while Trump has instant brand recognition. Not to mention their policy differences, with Trump being a broad populist and Perot focusing narrowly on NAFTA and trade agreements.
Since Trump's situation is radically different from Perot's, the earlier example of Perot predicts nothing about Trump today.
Slightly less lazy comparisons to George Wallace also don't hold up. When he sought the Democratic nomination in 1964, his appeal was largely regional (the Deep South), whereas Trump draws huge enthusiastic crowds in the Midwest, Plains, Deep South, Appalachia, New England, the Southwest -- everywhere, really. And he did not consistently dominate opinion polls. In 1968, he ran third party, but did not do so after dominating polls and coverage and crowds while earlier running on one of the two main parties. In 1972, he was nearly assassinated and his campaign ground to a halt. So far (knock on wood), no analogy can be drawn from Wallace's several campaigns to Trump's.
There has quite simply never been a candidate who was so dominating of the polls of a major party, media coverage, and crowd attendance, all throughout the second half of the year leading up to the primaries -- yet who was so loathed by the party's leadership, its elected officials, and his fellow candidates, let alone the other major party, with whom they launched an all-out mission to take him out.
Therefore, we have no idea whatsoever how the whole thing will unfold. Will the leadership bite the bullet and let him win, or try to sabotage him with attack ads? If that doesn't succeed, will they rig the primaries? If not, will they rig or buy off those at the Convention in the summer? Will they team up with Hillary to keep Trump from re-directing the Republican party? Or help to rig the general election? Or try to assassinate him?
We have no "big data" to draw on that would illuminate our current state of uncertainty. There just hasn't been anything like this before -- certainly, not an earlier example that also has tons of data to learn from. Our hunches may turn out to be right or wrong, but they will not be so on account of "what the data tell us". In an entirely unfamiliar setting, the data tell us nothing.
[1] Speaking of language, this is why computers cannot learn human languages to the degree we do. They do poorly with irregular forms, such as irregular verbs and irregular plurals. The statistical learning algorithms look for patterns between a present and past tense form of a verb, for thousands of verbs. It's not hard to learn the pattern for regular verbs -- stick "-ed" on the end. Some irregular verbs fall into families with similarities, but it's not hard-and-fast, and some verbs are sui generis.
Train the computer on verbs like "drink / drank / drunk" and they can correctly guess that "sing" goes "sing / sang / sung".
But ask it about the incredibly common verb "hit" -- it'll try to apply some variation to the root form, maybe "hit / hat / hut", or guess that it's regular "hit / hitted / hitted". All its guesses will be wrong since the forms are all the same, "hit / hit / hit". After training on "tooth / teeth," it won't be able to guess that it's "foot / feet," since the sound similarities between "tooth" and "foot" only held in an earlier stage of English (when the vowel was a long "oo"), and today they just have to be memorized individually.
These failures of machine learning apply very generally, and are the central weakness in connectionist and neural network approaches to modeling human language and cognition more broadly. They are good at abstracting associations within the data-set that they've been trained on, and can make good guesses about the properties of a new item if it resembles an item they've already seen. If the new item is unfamiliar from the training data-set, the guesses go all over the place and are all equally worthless.
Big data cannot think outside the box.
December 10, 2015
December 9, 2015
Political partisanship and career strivers vs. lifestyle strivers
When the current era of status-striving kicked off with the Me Generation during the 1970s, the domain of competition was the career world, which solidified into the yuppie phenomenon of the '80s. They also measure status by material things that cost enough money that owning them implies success in the career world -- a large house in a top zip code, second homes, luxury cars, boats, and so on.
As the career domain became saturated with strivers, the next generation took to the lifestyle domain for their status contests. See this earlier post. And now that lifestyle striving has become saturated, strivers are competing over who has the awesomest persona. For now we can group the lifestyle and persona strivers together, as forms of not-so-tangible striving, in contrast with the clearer measures of success in the career and materialist domain.
The political system responds to underlying sociological changes. During the Great Compression, both parties were not at war with each other as they were during the Gilded Age. They were not concerned with helping individuals advance their personal, or at most familial ambitions, but rather with stewarding the collective welfare of the entire nation. Republicans leaned more toward established business interests (not entrepreneurial strivers), and Democrats more toward labor unions (not identity politics groups, not outdoors enthusiasts).
As the Me Generation entered the electorate in huge numbers, so the party system came to be co-opted for the purposes of advancing the two camps of strivers -- Republicans representing career strivers, and Democrats the lifestyle / persona strivers. In a striving climate, the prevailing mood is laissez-faire -- no holds barred, when competitiveness starts soaring.
Republicans, as the career striver party, emphasized laissez-faire in the economy. In their appeal to voters, they came to be defined almost entirely by lowering income taxes, so that more of a career striver's income could go toward padding their net worth. Democrats, as the lifestyle / persona striver party, emphasized laissez-faire in the lifestyle and persona domains -- do whatever, whenever, with whoever. They came to be defined by breaking down barriers toward previously shunned lifestyles, as opposed to previously shunned business practices -- single mothers, homosexuals, drug addicts, and so on.
Republicans try to help career strivers with conspicuous consumption -- giving them more tax write-offs for homes and luxury items. Democrats try to help lifestyle strivers write off a symbol of their environmentalist lifestyle, like a hybrid car. They want to help lifestyle strivers go to college for free, since college is now training for lifestyle striving rather than career prep.
Where does the partisan conflict and polarization come from? With two separate modes of competition trying to establish themselves as the One True Status Contest by which all individuals shall be ranked, one has to degrade the other in importance. Sure, both career and lifestyle contribute to status, but (Republicans) career is more important, or (Democrats) lifestyle is more important.
Career strivers have enough trouble competing against each other -- if they could knock out the lifestyle strivers by persuading people that lifestyle contests don't matter, then they've just given themselves a huge, fast boost in status, with roughly one-half of the population now out of the status game. Likewise, lifestyle strivers will want to persuade people that career success doesn't matter, and suddenly they've eliminated half the population as status rivals.
But it only takes them so far to poke fun at the other camp -- Republicans belittling Democrats as "latte-sipping liberals," and Democrats painting Republicans as money-grubbing career drones.
What your side really needs to do is to demonize the other side. Playful ribbing won't shut them out of the status game -- portraying their entire approach to status competition as immoral and evil, will.
If the Democrats have based their appeal on laissez-faire in lifestyles, then Republicans will be forced to portray those changes as threats to the fate of the universe, in strongly moral terms. Championing gay marriage doesn't make you a loser in your career who's desperately trying to score lifestyle striver points by being a fag-hag -- it makes you someone who's opening up the gates of Hell.
And if Republicans have based their appeal on laissez-faire in the economy, then Democrats will be forced to portray deregulation and widening inequality in moralistic apocalyptic terms. It's not just those shallow materialist Republicans making it easier to keep their income, it's the forces of darkness breaking into our world.
Hence, the strident polarization we see today.
Republicans come to favor not only a deregulated economy, but a highly regulated lifestyle domain -- to shut down the other mode of status competition. And for the same reason, Democrats come to favor a deregulated lifestyle domain, but a highly regulated economy. This is all when appealing to voters, of course, since once in office the Democrats compromise and accept a fairly unregulated economy, and Republicans compromise and accept deregulated lifestyles. But they aren't total moves to the other side, they are just compromises, and Democrats remain relatively more in favor of economic regulation, and Republicans of lifestyle regulation.
In contrast, the Great Compression saw both parties aiming to regulate their domain of concern, which were the opposite of today's focus. Democrats focused on the economy, and pressed to regulate it. Republicans were focused on lifestyles (obscenity in pop culture, atheism, hatred of country, etc.) and sought to regulate them. Both sides accepted the regulations of the other, so that both the economy and lifestyle domains were decently regulated. Pornography was outlawed, but so were monopolistic business tendencies.
There's a lot more to be said. This post is to lay out the basic idea of looking at the two parties as the organized will of rivals pursuing two separate modes of status competition, career vs. lifestyle strivers. So much starts to fall into place once we see the parties from this point of view.
As the career domain became saturated with strivers, the next generation took to the lifestyle domain for their status contests. See this earlier post. And now that lifestyle striving has become saturated, strivers are competing over who has the awesomest persona. For now we can group the lifestyle and persona strivers together, as forms of not-so-tangible striving, in contrast with the clearer measures of success in the career and materialist domain.
The political system responds to underlying sociological changes. During the Great Compression, both parties were not at war with each other as they were during the Gilded Age. They were not concerned with helping individuals advance their personal, or at most familial ambitions, but rather with stewarding the collective welfare of the entire nation. Republicans leaned more toward established business interests (not entrepreneurial strivers), and Democrats more toward labor unions (not identity politics groups, not outdoors enthusiasts).
As the Me Generation entered the electorate in huge numbers, so the party system came to be co-opted for the purposes of advancing the two camps of strivers -- Republicans representing career strivers, and Democrats the lifestyle / persona strivers. In a striving climate, the prevailing mood is laissez-faire -- no holds barred, when competitiveness starts soaring.
Republicans, as the career striver party, emphasized laissez-faire in the economy. In their appeal to voters, they came to be defined almost entirely by lowering income taxes, so that more of a career striver's income could go toward padding their net worth. Democrats, as the lifestyle / persona striver party, emphasized laissez-faire in the lifestyle and persona domains -- do whatever, whenever, with whoever. They came to be defined by breaking down barriers toward previously shunned lifestyles, as opposed to previously shunned business practices -- single mothers, homosexuals, drug addicts, and so on.
Republicans try to help career strivers with conspicuous consumption -- giving them more tax write-offs for homes and luxury items. Democrats try to help lifestyle strivers write off a symbol of their environmentalist lifestyle, like a hybrid car. They want to help lifestyle strivers go to college for free, since college is now training for lifestyle striving rather than career prep.
Where does the partisan conflict and polarization come from? With two separate modes of competition trying to establish themselves as the One True Status Contest by which all individuals shall be ranked, one has to degrade the other in importance. Sure, both career and lifestyle contribute to status, but (Republicans) career is more important, or (Democrats) lifestyle is more important.
Career strivers have enough trouble competing against each other -- if they could knock out the lifestyle strivers by persuading people that lifestyle contests don't matter, then they've just given themselves a huge, fast boost in status, with roughly one-half of the population now out of the status game. Likewise, lifestyle strivers will want to persuade people that career success doesn't matter, and suddenly they've eliminated half the population as status rivals.
But it only takes them so far to poke fun at the other camp -- Republicans belittling Democrats as "latte-sipping liberals," and Democrats painting Republicans as money-grubbing career drones.
What your side really needs to do is to demonize the other side. Playful ribbing won't shut them out of the status game -- portraying their entire approach to status competition as immoral and evil, will.
If the Democrats have based their appeal on laissez-faire in lifestyles, then Republicans will be forced to portray those changes as threats to the fate of the universe, in strongly moral terms. Championing gay marriage doesn't make you a loser in your career who's desperately trying to score lifestyle striver points by being a fag-hag -- it makes you someone who's opening up the gates of Hell.
And if Republicans have based their appeal on laissez-faire in the economy, then Democrats will be forced to portray deregulation and widening inequality in moralistic apocalyptic terms. It's not just those shallow materialist Republicans making it easier to keep their income, it's the forces of darkness breaking into our world.
Hence, the strident polarization we see today.
Republicans come to favor not only a deregulated economy, but a highly regulated lifestyle domain -- to shut down the other mode of status competition. And for the same reason, Democrats come to favor a deregulated lifestyle domain, but a highly regulated economy. This is all when appealing to voters, of course, since once in office the Democrats compromise and accept a fairly unregulated economy, and Republicans compromise and accept deregulated lifestyles. But they aren't total moves to the other side, they are just compromises, and Democrats remain relatively more in favor of economic regulation, and Republicans of lifestyle regulation.
In contrast, the Great Compression saw both parties aiming to regulate their domain of concern, which were the opposite of today's focus. Democrats focused on the economy, and pressed to regulate it. Republicans were focused on lifestyles (obscenity in pop culture, atheism, hatred of country, etc.) and sought to regulate them. Both sides accepted the regulations of the other, so that both the economy and lifestyle domains were decently regulated. Pornography was outlawed, but so were monopolistic business tendencies.
There's a lot more to be said. This post is to lay out the basic idea of looking at the two parties as the organized will of rivals pursuing two separate modes of status competition, career vs. lifestyle strivers. So much starts to fall into place once we see the parties from this point of view.
December 8, 2015
The Millennial Le Pen as the next Joan of Arc?
From an overview in the Daily Mail:
While Marine Le Pen hailed the 'magnificent' performance of the National Front last night, it is her niece who has become the poster girl for France's far-Right as the party achieved record gains.
Marion Marechal-Le Pen, France’s youngest-ever MP when elected at 22, is on course to lead the southern Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur region with polls giving her some 40 per cent of the vote.
The 25-year-old has emerged as the rising star of the National Front and is seen by many as the ideological successor to her 87-year-old grandfather, National Front (FN) founder Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Shitlording skips a generation.
Marechal-Le Pen is much further to the Right than her aunt Marine Le Pen, who has tried to soften the party’s image and even helped expel her father from the party over anti-Semitic Holocaust comments.
The mother-of-one plays a leading role in anti-gay marriage rallies, backing what she calls the ‘traditional family’.
She insists everybody – especially the five million Muslims living in France – should accept the ‘true French identity’ rooted in Christianity.
If she weren't already married, she sounds like a nice match for one of the Trump men.
She is also outspoken, recently using the word ‘moronic’ while addressing the Socialist prime minister.
‘Marion has dumped her grandfather’s anti-Semitism, but beyond that sounds just like him,’ said one FN source.
She is also adept at invoking the mysticism and legend of the ‘old France’, regularly referring to national heroes such as Joan of Arc.
Speaking of, here's a reminder from the old days when paying tribute to French history invoked its nationalist heroes, rather than its "come one, come all" cosmopolitanism in a grab for quasi-French cultural identity:
Trump: Are John McCain and Lindsey Graham ambiguously gay for each other?
After recently referring to Hillary Clinton and her aide Huma being lesbian partners (here at 13:23), Trump now puzzles over why Lindsey Graham and John McCain are always sitting together, they're like the Bobbsey twins (instinctively picking up on gays as infantilized), just once he'd like to see Graham sitting by himself, etc. (here at 11:45). He even throws in a Seinfeld reference afterward -- "I'm not knockin' it..." ("Not that there's anything wrong with that...").
Graham is a barely closeted fag, but I never thought about McCain before. Honestly, I don't follow TV media, so I don't know any of his mannerisms or typical facial expressions, other than he has weird-looking cheeks. But after being tipped off by the Trumpmeister, I went searching Google Images, and found lots of pictures of him with noticeable, albeit not flaming gayface.
The telltale sign is the inability to smile like a grown-up, pulling the upper lip tightly out toward the sides, and lowering the lower lip so as to show the lower row of teeth. Only babies smile that way, which identifies the male homosexual as one who is still mentally in the "ewww, girls are yucky" stage of social development.
See for yourself:
So, are these two Senators literally gay for each other, or just unusually chummy on account of their shared unusual sexual orientation? Beats me, but I wouldn't rule out them having had something sometime (Graham obviously being the bottom):
In 21st-century America, Democrats welcome the lesbos, Republicans welcome the nancyboys.
BTW, that helps to explain the hysterical caricature of hawkish militarism that both McCain and Graham are known for. Since gayness is defined by infantilization, they're like the 7 year-old boy who wants to declare war on the whole world, unilaterally, for not agreeing with him or for shutting him out of some group.
Graham is a barely closeted fag, but I never thought about McCain before. Honestly, I don't follow TV media, so I don't know any of his mannerisms or typical facial expressions, other than he has weird-looking cheeks. But after being tipped off by the Trumpmeister, I went searching Google Images, and found lots of pictures of him with noticeable, albeit not flaming gayface.
The telltale sign is the inability to smile like a grown-up, pulling the upper lip tightly out toward the sides, and lowering the lower lip so as to show the lower row of teeth. Only babies smile that way, which identifies the male homosexual as one who is still mentally in the "ewww, girls are yucky" stage of social development.
See for yourself:
So, are these two Senators literally gay for each other, or just unusually chummy on account of their shared unusual sexual orientation? Beats me, but I wouldn't rule out them having had something sometime (Graham obviously being the bottom):
In 21st-century America, Democrats welcome the lesbos, Republicans welcome the nancyboys.
BTW, that helps to explain the hysterical caricature of hawkish militarism that both McCain and Graham are known for. Since gayness is defined by infantilization, they're like the 7 year-old boy who wants to declare war on the whole world, unilaterally, for not agreeing with him or for shutting him out of some group.
December 7, 2015
The myth of Christian terrorism
Now that we're going to be talking a lot about Islamic terrorism, you're going to hear the inevitable double-talk about how "We condemn all forms of terrorism -- be they Islamic, Mormon, Buddhist, or Amish."
I looked up the internet know-it-all's guide to talking points, Wikipedia, to know what to be prepared for when I hear about Christian terrorism. I expected to find a small list of bad acts, just to be aware of them and not be caught off-guard when they're brought up, while pointing out how much longer the list of Islamic terrorist atrocities is.
Shockingly -- or not -- I couldn't find a single incident of terrorism committed by Christians. It turns out that all of their examples are either not terrorism, or not committed by Christians. I don't mean that I'm disqualifying the perpetrators of being Christians ex post facto -- they committed this attack, so they could not have been true Christians -- I mean they showed no proof of being believing and practicing Christians beforehand.
We must bear in mind some key traits of terrorism. It is meant to harm people or things whom the attackers themselves believe to be innocent, but are in some way standing as representatives of something larger that the attackers hate. This is what gives terrorism its indiscriminate and mass-killing character, rather than focusing on a small number of guilty individuals. And it is meant to send a message, via public spectacle, to other members of that group, putting them in a state of fear for their safety, way of life, and so on.
For example, killing random workers at the World Trade Center on 9/11 -- none of the jihadists knew who they were at the individual level, let alone had beef with them specifically. They were just interchangeable "Americans" whose foreign policy Al-Qaeda wanted to change. The concert-goers in the Paris attacks were not chosen for having committed specific bad acts, but simply for belonging to a group whose way of life the terrorists wanted to change ("decadent Westerners," French imperialist foreign policy, etc.).
We must also bear in mind that being a Christian means you have certain key beliefs about the New Testament and Jesus Christ. Ranting about the Ten Commandments or Sodom and Gomorrah doesn't distinguish you as a Christian, although it would be compatible with being Christian. And it means you follow certain practices and attend religious services in a Christian way. Practice and ritual are as important, or perhaps more so, than mere beliefs when it comes to determining who belongs to a religious group. So, someone who reads the book of Revelation every night but never goes to church, doesn't confess their sins, doesn't repent, doesn't try to "go and sin no more," etc., is not a Christian.
With that in mind, let's run through Wikipedia's list of examples, none of which hold up.
The Gunpowder Plot. Not terrorism because it was part of factional violence leading up to open civil war in England. It did not target innocents or civilians, but the King and members of Parliament who were on the other side of a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics.
Pogroms. Not religiously motivated, but an ethnic clash between Jews as an ethnic group and Slavs. The motivation given was to free our ethnic group from a parasitic ethnic group, not to avenge a central figure from our religion who was killed or maligned by members of their religion.
Ku Klux Klan. Similar to pogroms. Not religiously motivated, rather an ethnic clash between founding-stock whites vs. blacks and some new immigrant groups. They used Christian symbolism (burning crosses), but did not hold Christian beliefs or follow Christian practices according to any mainstream or even not-so-mainstream tradition. Believing Jesus was the first Klansman, for instance. They were cosplay Christians.
Various conflicts in Africa and India. Sounds more like more local ethnic conflicts where one group decides to identify its side by appropriating Christian symbols and rhetoric, without being believing and practicing Christians. Or having the goal of ethnic cleansing, rather than creating a state of terror or panic in order to enact certain policy or lifestyle changes. Or being parties to civil war (see below).
Maronite Christians in the Lebanese Civil War. Politically motivated violence between two factions of a civil war. Terrorism assumes a certain level of central government control, and the terrorists are either sending a message to The Powers That Be, or they are telling other non-state groups that the central authorities cannot protect them as well as they had believed. That feeling of insecurity, fear, etc., is a break from normalcy.
In a civil war, though, no such central authority and security of groups and individuals is assumed. One side targets innocent civilians on the other -- of course, that's how it's always been in warfare. The experience is certainly terrifying, but it is not terrorism, which is a marked disruption of everyday order and stability -- not one of an endless number of everyday acts of indiscriminate violence during the anarchy of civil war.
Anti-abortion violence. Far and away the main focus of denunciations of Christian terrorism, especially in America. The many examples in this category can be ruled out due to the acts not being terrorist, and in a large fraction of the examples, the actors not being Christians.
First, killing an abortion-providing doctor is not indiscriminate and does not harm people and places whom the attackers believe to be innocent. Since in the attackers' mind, abortion is a form of murder, the motive is straightforward revenge for past murders, and prevention of future murders. You're free to disagree with where they set the beginning of life, that abortion is not murder, etc., but you can't say that their motive is anything other than punishment of past crimes and prevention of future crimes, as they see abortion as a crime.
And by going after the doctors themselves, they show a concern with reciprocity at the individual level -- provide abortion, become a target -- rather than going after "doctors" in general, most of whom have not performed an abortion, just to send a message to the profession about its participation in abortion. Someone shooting up a conference of the American Medical Association, say. But that assignment of collective guilt and indiscriminate targeting of individuals never happens with the anti-abortion attacks. Hell, they don't even try to attack proponents or propagandists for abortion rights -- only the doctors who perform them, and any collateral damage from that.
Their property destruction is likewise focused and based on reciprocity. They don't target hospitals in general, clinics in general, offices belonging to medical professional organizations, or the press organs of abortion rights groups -- or even general press outlets that wrote pro-choice editorials. It's only those specific sites where abortions are being performed. If they were true terrorists, they might even blow up something completely unrelated to abortion, like a subway or a marathon, in order to grab the attention of people who might not otherwise be thinking about abortion politics, or to suggest that any target is legitimate in the service of a just cause.
Furthermore, most of the attackers in these non-terrorist attacks are not Christian. Some follow the familiar pattern of appropriating Christian symbols or rhetoric, but are not believing and practicing Christians. Just ask what church they go to, and how often. Or what parts of the Bible motivate them -- probably something as simple as "Thou shalt not kill," which is part of the Old Testament and not distinctly Christian. Quoting Jesus or Paul would be more convincing of a Christian motivation.
A handful are actual Christians, usually it seems from the Catholic Church.
Aside from the cosplay Christians, though, the other major sub-group is the paranoid anarcho-libertarian type, linked more to an anti-government militia than to a Christian church, or indeed to any religious body. Being paranoid about just about any form of government, and thriving more Out West, it's clear that they're libertarian rather than conservative.
Their focus only on abortion rather than also on pornography, sodomy laws, gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc., also belies their libertarian moral foundation, which like its liberal cousin, is based on preventing harm and administering justice. Matters of purity, taboo, sanctity, and so on, do not play much of a role in their anger. They see abortion as the state-sanctioned harming of innocent people, not as a perversion, corruption, or abomination.
And of course the two main groups show some overlap, with paranoid anarcho-libertarian militia-men LARP-ing as Christian warriors (without actually having any beliefs about Christ, performing Christian rituals, or attending Christian services).
I'm not surprised that "Christian terrorism" turns out to be just another liberal urban legend, but I thought at least there would be a kernel of truth to it that was being hysterically exaggerated. Nope, just like there's no Buddhist terrorism, Mormon terrorism, Voodoo terrorism, or indeed anything other than Islamic terrorism. And perhaps Jewish terrorism -- most terrorism from Jews is part of an ethnic conflict and often committed by secular or atheist Jews, but there are incidents like the Ultra-Orthodox Israeli man who has gone on two separate stabbing sprees during a gay pride parade in Jerusalem.
In fact, think of how absent Christian terrorist boogey-men have been at gay pride parades in the West. Targeting abortion clinics is so Nineties. These days, it would be a pride parade. And yet where are the explosions? There is no anti-homo terrorism, let alone from a believing and practicing Christian group.
Christians did not spread their religion by violent conquest, but by persuasive evangelism. Early Christians were in no position to conquer the Roman Empire, who had already crucified their Messiah. Likewise Christian efforts to defeat the scourge of abortion, sodomite marriage, etc., take the form of changing hearts and minds.
The initial spread of Islam was by violent military conquest, so it shouldn't be surprising to find that their ideological battles will have a distinctly violent component to them.
I looked up the internet know-it-all's guide to talking points, Wikipedia, to know what to be prepared for when I hear about Christian terrorism. I expected to find a small list of bad acts, just to be aware of them and not be caught off-guard when they're brought up, while pointing out how much longer the list of Islamic terrorist atrocities is.
Shockingly -- or not -- I couldn't find a single incident of terrorism committed by Christians. It turns out that all of their examples are either not terrorism, or not committed by Christians. I don't mean that I'm disqualifying the perpetrators of being Christians ex post facto -- they committed this attack, so they could not have been true Christians -- I mean they showed no proof of being believing and practicing Christians beforehand.
We must bear in mind some key traits of terrorism. It is meant to harm people or things whom the attackers themselves believe to be innocent, but are in some way standing as representatives of something larger that the attackers hate. This is what gives terrorism its indiscriminate and mass-killing character, rather than focusing on a small number of guilty individuals. And it is meant to send a message, via public spectacle, to other members of that group, putting them in a state of fear for their safety, way of life, and so on.
For example, killing random workers at the World Trade Center on 9/11 -- none of the jihadists knew who they were at the individual level, let alone had beef with them specifically. They were just interchangeable "Americans" whose foreign policy Al-Qaeda wanted to change. The concert-goers in the Paris attacks were not chosen for having committed specific bad acts, but simply for belonging to a group whose way of life the terrorists wanted to change ("decadent Westerners," French imperialist foreign policy, etc.).
We must also bear in mind that being a Christian means you have certain key beliefs about the New Testament and Jesus Christ. Ranting about the Ten Commandments or Sodom and Gomorrah doesn't distinguish you as a Christian, although it would be compatible with being Christian. And it means you follow certain practices and attend religious services in a Christian way. Practice and ritual are as important, or perhaps more so, than mere beliefs when it comes to determining who belongs to a religious group. So, someone who reads the book of Revelation every night but never goes to church, doesn't confess their sins, doesn't repent, doesn't try to "go and sin no more," etc., is not a Christian.
With that in mind, let's run through Wikipedia's list of examples, none of which hold up.
The Gunpowder Plot. Not terrorism because it was part of factional violence leading up to open civil war in England. It did not target innocents or civilians, but the King and members of Parliament who were on the other side of a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics.
Pogroms. Not religiously motivated, but an ethnic clash between Jews as an ethnic group and Slavs. The motivation given was to free our ethnic group from a parasitic ethnic group, not to avenge a central figure from our religion who was killed or maligned by members of their religion.
Ku Klux Klan. Similar to pogroms. Not religiously motivated, rather an ethnic clash between founding-stock whites vs. blacks and some new immigrant groups. They used Christian symbolism (burning crosses), but did not hold Christian beliefs or follow Christian practices according to any mainstream or even not-so-mainstream tradition. Believing Jesus was the first Klansman, for instance. They were cosplay Christians.
Various conflicts in Africa and India. Sounds more like more local ethnic conflicts where one group decides to identify its side by appropriating Christian symbols and rhetoric, without being believing and practicing Christians. Or having the goal of ethnic cleansing, rather than creating a state of terror or panic in order to enact certain policy or lifestyle changes. Or being parties to civil war (see below).
Maronite Christians in the Lebanese Civil War. Politically motivated violence between two factions of a civil war. Terrorism assumes a certain level of central government control, and the terrorists are either sending a message to The Powers That Be, or they are telling other non-state groups that the central authorities cannot protect them as well as they had believed. That feeling of insecurity, fear, etc., is a break from normalcy.
In a civil war, though, no such central authority and security of groups and individuals is assumed. One side targets innocent civilians on the other -- of course, that's how it's always been in warfare. The experience is certainly terrifying, but it is not terrorism, which is a marked disruption of everyday order and stability -- not one of an endless number of everyday acts of indiscriminate violence during the anarchy of civil war.
Anti-abortion violence. Far and away the main focus of denunciations of Christian terrorism, especially in America. The many examples in this category can be ruled out due to the acts not being terrorist, and in a large fraction of the examples, the actors not being Christians.
First, killing an abortion-providing doctor is not indiscriminate and does not harm people and places whom the attackers believe to be innocent. Since in the attackers' mind, abortion is a form of murder, the motive is straightforward revenge for past murders, and prevention of future murders. You're free to disagree with where they set the beginning of life, that abortion is not murder, etc., but you can't say that their motive is anything other than punishment of past crimes and prevention of future crimes, as they see abortion as a crime.
And by going after the doctors themselves, they show a concern with reciprocity at the individual level -- provide abortion, become a target -- rather than going after "doctors" in general, most of whom have not performed an abortion, just to send a message to the profession about its participation in abortion. Someone shooting up a conference of the American Medical Association, say. But that assignment of collective guilt and indiscriminate targeting of individuals never happens with the anti-abortion attacks. Hell, they don't even try to attack proponents or propagandists for abortion rights -- only the doctors who perform them, and any collateral damage from that.
Their property destruction is likewise focused and based on reciprocity. They don't target hospitals in general, clinics in general, offices belonging to medical professional organizations, or the press organs of abortion rights groups -- or even general press outlets that wrote pro-choice editorials. It's only those specific sites where abortions are being performed. If they were true terrorists, they might even blow up something completely unrelated to abortion, like a subway or a marathon, in order to grab the attention of people who might not otherwise be thinking about abortion politics, or to suggest that any target is legitimate in the service of a just cause.
Furthermore, most of the attackers in these non-terrorist attacks are not Christian. Some follow the familiar pattern of appropriating Christian symbols or rhetoric, but are not believing and practicing Christians. Just ask what church they go to, and how often. Or what parts of the Bible motivate them -- probably something as simple as "Thou shalt not kill," which is part of the Old Testament and not distinctly Christian. Quoting Jesus or Paul would be more convincing of a Christian motivation.
A handful are actual Christians, usually it seems from the Catholic Church.
Aside from the cosplay Christians, though, the other major sub-group is the paranoid anarcho-libertarian type, linked more to an anti-government militia than to a Christian church, or indeed to any religious body. Being paranoid about just about any form of government, and thriving more Out West, it's clear that they're libertarian rather than conservative.
Their focus only on abortion rather than also on pornography, sodomy laws, gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc., also belies their libertarian moral foundation, which like its liberal cousin, is based on preventing harm and administering justice. Matters of purity, taboo, sanctity, and so on, do not play much of a role in their anger. They see abortion as the state-sanctioned harming of innocent people, not as a perversion, corruption, or abomination.
And of course the two main groups show some overlap, with paranoid anarcho-libertarian militia-men LARP-ing as Christian warriors (without actually having any beliefs about Christ, performing Christian rituals, or attending Christian services).
I'm not surprised that "Christian terrorism" turns out to be just another liberal urban legend, but I thought at least there would be a kernel of truth to it that was being hysterically exaggerated. Nope, just like there's no Buddhist terrorism, Mormon terrorism, Voodoo terrorism, or indeed anything other than Islamic terrorism. And perhaps Jewish terrorism -- most terrorism from Jews is part of an ethnic conflict and often committed by secular or atheist Jews, but there are incidents like the Ultra-Orthodox Israeli man who has gone on two separate stabbing sprees during a gay pride parade in Jerusalem.
In fact, think of how absent Christian terrorist boogey-men have been at gay pride parades in the West. Targeting abortion clinics is so Nineties. These days, it would be a pride parade. And yet where are the explosions? There is no anti-homo terrorism, let alone from a believing and practicing Christian group.
Christians did not spread their religion by violent conquest, but by persuasive evangelism. Early Christians were in no position to conquer the Roman Empire, who had already crucified their Messiah. Likewise Christian efforts to defeat the scourge of abortion, sodomite marriage, etc., take the form of changing hearts and minds.
The initial spread of Islam was by violent military conquest, so it shouldn't be surprising to find that their ideological battles will have a distinctly violent component to them.
December 6, 2015
Do pro-life girls have more fertile body shapes?
Honest question, and no research on topic that I could quickly find, despite there being a cottage industry for academic articles about what correlates with an hourglass vs. a tubular waist-to-hip ratio.
I've been looking into the history of the pro-life movement, and since there's an apparent revival under Millennial college students, I checked out Google Images for "pro-life students" to see what they're like -- normal, hipster, etc.
While it wasn't every girl, they were far more likely to have hourglass shapes, in an age where it seems like you don't see that body type much anymore, especially among Millennials. Even when they were a bit overweight, they still had hourglass shapes, rather than being uniformly wide blobs. They also smile more. More designed for birthing in their physiology, more pro-natal in their political views.
Some examples (girl on left, girl in peach shirt, girl in orange shirt):
The pro-choice students had more boyish waist-to-hip ratios, and generally didn't smile (notwithstanding one of the examples below). When they were fat, they were fat all over, not in a Rubenesque way. Bodies less capable of conceiving and delivering, minds less inclined to protect childbearing.
See for example:
I've been looking into the history of the pro-life movement, and since there's an apparent revival under Millennial college students, I checked out Google Images for "pro-life students" to see what they're like -- normal, hipster, etc.
While it wasn't every girl, they were far more likely to have hourglass shapes, in an age where it seems like you don't see that body type much anymore, especially among Millennials. Even when they were a bit overweight, they still had hourglass shapes, rather than being uniformly wide blobs. They also smile more. More designed for birthing in their physiology, more pro-natal in their political views.
Some examples (girl on left, girl in peach shirt, girl in orange shirt):
The pro-choice students had more boyish waist-to-hip ratios, and generally didn't smile (notwithstanding one of the examples below). When they were fat, they were fat all over, not in a Rubenesque way. Bodies less capable of conceiving and delivering, minds less inclined to protect childbearing.
See for example:
December 5, 2015
Who will un-cuck the Left?
Comparisons of Bernie Sanders with Donald Trump are misleading because, although the underdog Democrat's platform is the most populist among those allowed onto the debate stage, he's still hamstrung by commitments to all sorts of phony ideological distraction issues that alienate regular people -- climate change, Black Lives Matter, gun control, abortion rights, and anything having to do with faggots.
He has begun invoking FDR to defend identifying as a socialist, but Roosevelt had no time for these feel-good social and cultural topics. To his credit, Sanders devotes more focus on widening inequality, non-hawkish military policies, and direct election of campaign donors.
And yet if he wants higher wages for working people and narrowing inequality, he should copy his hero and emphasize minimal immigration (supply of labor up, wages down) and a strong labor union movement.
He wants to skip over all the hard work of the early 20th century -- tightening up the borders, deporting foreigners, and building a strong union movement -- and skip right to the prosperous and egalitarian Midcentury. It's no wonder his campaign does best with naive college kids desperate to square the circle of worshiping political correctness while returning to the 1950s.
The last time that populism won big-time, it began under the Republicans, with Teddy Roosevelt pursuing Progressivist reforms -- in the old, political and economic sense, not a frivolous social and cultural sense. Trump will clearly play the role of the latter-day Teddy Roosevelt. But who will follow him to become the next FDR?
It probably wouldn't happen for a few more election cycles, and he would probably be a generation younger than the initiator of populism. So, he would be a Gen X-er (probably a later one, since they're more liberal), and would have begun his political career as a populist insurgent against an entrenched party elite in a major city. FDR started a bit early at the age of 28 as State Senator from New York, but with the lifespan being more stretched out these days, maybe his reincarnation will have gotten his start a little later. Might as well just quote Wikipedia on his political origins:
A reminder about Tammany Hall for those who've forgotten their American history class:
Insurgent challenges elite of a corrupt party machine whose base is hordes of immigrants -- doesn't exactly ring a bell for any Democrat right now, but then the election where FDR first began to up-end business as usual, in 1910, came one cycle after Teddy Roosevelt had already left his second term in office, paving the way for populism as a winning platform. So the latter-day FDR may not even get his foot in the door until the end of the second Trump administration.
Keep your eyes peeled in 10 years -- an insurgent Democrat just might say, The hell with pandering to immigrant hordes and corrupt party elites, and set himself along the path toward becoming the architect of the New New Deal.
He has begun invoking FDR to defend identifying as a socialist, but Roosevelt had no time for these feel-good social and cultural topics. To his credit, Sanders devotes more focus on widening inequality, non-hawkish military policies, and direct election of campaign donors.
And yet if he wants higher wages for working people and narrowing inequality, he should copy his hero and emphasize minimal immigration (supply of labor up, wages down) and a strong labor union movement.
He wants to skip over all the hard work of the early 20th century -- tightening up the borders, deporting foreigners, and building a strong union movement -- and skip right to the prosperous and egalitarian Midcentury. It's no wonder his campaign does best with naive college kids desperate to square the circle of worshiping political correctness while returning to the 1950s.
The last time that populism won big-time, it began under the Republicans, with Teddy Roosevelt pursuing Progressivist reforms -- in the old, political and economic sense, not a frivolous social and cultural sense. Trump will clearly play the role of the latter-day Teddy Roosevelt. But who will follow him to become the next FDR?
It probably wouldn't happen for a few more election cycles, and he would probably be a generation younger than the initiator of populism. So, he would be a Gen X-er (probably a later one, since they're more liberal), and would have begun his political career as a populist insurgent against an entrenched party elite in a major city. FDR started a bit early at the age of 28 as State Senator from New York, but with the lifespan being more stretched out these days, maybe his reincarnation will have gotten his start a little later. Might as well just quote Wikipedia on his political origins:
Taking his seat on January 1, 1911, Roosevelt immediately became the leader of a group of "Insurgents" who opposed the bossism of the Tammany machine dominating the state Democratic Party. The U.S. Senate election, which began with the Democratic caucus on January 16, 1911, was deadlocked by the struggle of the two factions for 74 days, as the new legislator endured what a biographer later described as "the full might of Tammany" behind its choice, William F. Sheehan. (Popular election of US Senators did not occur until after a constitutional amendment.)
On March 31 compromise candidate James A. O'Gorman was elected, giving Roosevelt national exposure and some experience in political tactics and intrigue; one Tammany leader warned that Roosevelt should be eliminated immediately, before he disrupted Democrats as much as his cousin disrupted the Republicans. [Does Trump have any Gen X cousins out there?] Roosevelt soon became a popular figure among New York Democrats, though he had not as yet become an eloquent speaker. News articles and cartoons began depicting "the second coming of a Roosevelt" that sent "cold shivers down the spine of Tammany".
A reminder about Tammany Hall for those who've forgotten their American history class:
After 1854, the [Tammany] Society expanded its political control even further by earning the loyalty of [New York City's] rapidly expanding immigrant community, which functioned as its base of political capital. The business community appreciated its readiness, at moderate cost, to cut through red tape and legislative mazes to facilitate rapid economic growth, The Tammany Hall ward boss or ward heeler – "wards" were the city's smallest political units from 1786 to 1938 – served as the local vote gatherer and provider of patronage.
Insurgent challenges elite of a corrupt party machine whose base is hordes of immigrants -- doesn't exactly ring a bell for any Democrat right now, but then the election where FDR first began to up-end business as usual, in 1910, came one cycle after Teddy Roosevelt had already left his second term in office, paving the way for populism as a winning platform. So the latter-day FDR may not even get his foot in the door until the end of the second Trump administration.
Keep your eyes peeled in 10 years -- an insurgent Democrat just might say, The hell with pandering to immigrant hordes and corrupt party elites, and set himself along the path toward becoming the architect of the New New Deal.
December 2, 2015
How likely were NJ Muslims to celebrate on 9/11? And go to Lexis-Nexis for further confirming reports
Here is a good effort from Breitbart to document there being reports of Muslims in New Jersey celebrating the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11, backing up the gist of what Trump said.
Anyone who has access to Lexis-Nexis should search it to find reports that are not going to be on the internet -- small local newspapers, for instance. I don't have access at the moment, but most public libraries and research libraries do. If you're a student, you definitely have access. I might do it when I have the time, but others should start in the meantime.
You want to search all newspapers, not just the major ones. Restrict the date to 9/11/2001 through... I don't know, the end of the month, or year? Then search for terms like "World Trade Center" and "Muslims" and "Jersey". If that open-ended search gives too many results to skim, narrow it down by adding "celebrating" or "cheering" or "dancing" or etc.
With all the examples that are turning up from people scouring the internet, there are bound to be many more from established newspapers that can only be searched with Lexis-Nexis.
All the Trump haters are trying to bury these reports or spin them so that it wasn't really a big deal -- so it was only dozens or maybe hundreds, but not "thousands and thousands" like Trump said. Across all the various sites where celebrations took place, maybe it was thousands.
But even if not, the real number to pay attention to is the probability that a Muslim in Jersey City (or wherever) celebrated the 9/11 destruction, when they had the opportunity to. We must compare the number of actual Muslim celebrators on 9/11 to the total number who could have done so. This tells us how likely they were to cheer on a massive terrorist attack on their host nation.
The numerator of the fraction is however many celebrators there were. Let's say it was in the hundreds across the entire city, given reports of "tailgate" style parties.
For the denominator, let's take Paterson, NJ, home to the second-largest Muslim population in America, and one of the sites named in the reports of 9/11 celebrators. Wikipedia says its Muslim population is 25,000 to 30,000 -- I'll put it at 20,000 back in 2001, since we're talking before the massive immigration of the 2000s.
Now, not all of them were free to celebrate by dancing and holding a tailgate party -- some were in school, some were too old and frail, and some were toddlers. According to the 2000 Census for New Jersey, people aged 20 to 69 made up 30% of the population, and I'll assume it was similar for the Muslims. This leaves 6,000 Muslims aged 20 to 69.
But remember that the two towers were struck from 8:45 to 9:00 on a Tuesday morning, meaning most of the celebrating would be during work hours. I also doubt that eyewitnesses would have seen very much after it got somewhat dark, so again the celebrations would have taken place during the work day -- and possibly more at night that eyewitnesses could not detect just walking or driving around.
The BLS says the labor force participation rate for 2000 was 67%, and it was probably lower for Muslims in New Jersey. Perhaps 50% to 60%. That leaves 40% to 50% left to celebrate, or between 2,400 and 3000 people.
If there were even 30 Muslims in Paterson celebrating on 9/11, that would be at least 1% of all who could have done so. If the various parties added up to the low hundreds, say 300, that would be a mindblowing rate of 10%. It must have been somewhere in that range.
You may think that a chance of 1 in 100 or 1 in 10 isn't that high -- but we shouldn't take this probability in isolation. We should compare to other Americans, whether founding-stock whites, immigrants, other non-Christian groups (Hindus), etc. As far as I've heard, none of these other groups held outdoor celebrations in the wake of the two towers coming down.
The entire US population in 2000 was 282 million -- so perhaps there were a handful around the country who escaped notice, for a rate of maybe 1 in 10 million or 1 in 100 million? In other words, Muslims in Paterson were "only" about a million times more likely than the rest of us to openly celebrate the destruction of the World Trade Center.
This is all back-of-the-envelope stuff here, so maybe they'll turn out to be "only" 10,000 times more likely than the rest of us.
And 1 in 10 or 1 in 100 is not a "low" rate, for the kind of act we're talking about. Not that they inwardly felt neither grief nor excitement -- but outwardly cheering on the largest terrorist attack on America. Imagine a mosque in Paterson with 100 regular members -- then somewhere between 1 and 10 of these seemingly innocent regular religious attenders from the neighborhood would have revealed themselves to be traitors. That's the thanks we get for letting them into our country.
Even among those who did not celebrate openly, some fraction would have been sympathetic but lacked the nerve or felt enough shame not to dance in the streets during 9/11. It could be up to half or more of the Muslim population there who are bitterly hostile toward their host nation.
And even if they don't go on to blow up another airliner and skyscraper, those aren't the kind of people we want in our communities. They are incapable of integrating, and will corrode whatever sense of trust, norms, and togetherness we may have.
Not that there's a whole lot of trust and solidarity to destroy in New Jersey -- but opening the floodgates of immigration is only going to make it worse (see Robert Putnam's study on diversity weakening trust in communities). And certainly the rest of the country, where there are strong communities, does not need a single Muslim immigrant. And those who are already there may be hostile to their host community, and some may need to be kept an eye on.
All journalists are innumerate, so I don't expect them to understand the need to focus on a probability rather than a count, let alone how to work with fractions and make use of publicly available data. They get paid too much money to use their brain.
But what's really disgusting is how they're trying to whitewash the whole thing from history. Do your part and go search Lexis-Nexis to add to the growing list of reports of Muslims in America (especially New Jersey) celebrating on 9/11.
Anyone who has access to Lexis-Nexis should search it to find reports that are not going to be on the internet -- small local newspapers, for instance. I don't have access at the moment, but most public libraries and research libraries do. If you're a student, you definitely have access. I might do it when I have the time, but others should start in the meantime.
You want to search all newspapers, not just the major ones. Restrict the date to 9/11/2001 through... I don't know, the end of the month, or year? Then search for terms like "World Trade Center" and "Muslims" and "Jersey". If that open-ended search gives too many results to skim, narrow it down by adding "celebrating" or "cheering" or "dancing" or etc.
With all the examples that are turning up from people scouring the internet, there are bound to be many more from established newspapers that can only be searched with Lexis-Nexis.
All the Trump haters are trying to bury these reports or spin them so that it wasn't really a big deal -- so it was only dozens or maybe hundreds, but not "thousands and thousands" like Trump said. Across all the various sites where celebrations took place, maybe it was thousands.
But even if not, the real number to pay attention to is the probability that a Muslim in Jersey City (or wherever) celebrated the 9/11 destruction, when they had the opportunity to. We must compare the number of actual Muslim celebrators on 9/11 to the total number who could have done so. This tells us how likely they were to cheer on a massive terrorist attack on their host nation.
The numerator of the fraction is however many celebrators there were. Let's say it was in the hundreds across the entire city, given reports of "tailgate" style parties.
For the denominator, let's take Paterson, NJ, home to the second-largest Muslim population in America, and one of the sites named in the reports of 9/11 celebrators. Wikipedia says its Muslim population is 25,000 to 30,000 -- I'll put it at 20,000 back in 2001, since we're talking before the massive immigration of the 2000s.
Now, not all of them were free to celebrate by dancing and holding a tailgate party -- some were in school, some were too old and frail, and some were toddlers. According to the 2000 Census for New Jersey, people aged 20 to 69 made up 30% of the population, and I'll assume it was similar for the Muslims. This leaves 6,000 Muslims aged 20 to 69.
But remember that the two towers were struck from 8:45 to 9:00 on a Tuesday morning, meaning most of the celebrating would be during work hours. I also doubt that eyewitnesses would have seen very much after it got somewhat dark, so again the celebrations would have taken place during the work day -- and possibly more at night that eyewitnesses could not detect just walking or driving around.
The BLS says the labor force participation rate for 2000 was 67%, and it was probably lower for Muslims in New Jersey. Perhaps 50% to 60%. That leaves 40% to 50% left to celebrate, or between 2,400 and 3000 people.
If there were even 30 Muslims in Paterson celebrating on 9/11, that would be at least 1% of all who could have done so. If the various parties added up to the low hundreds, say 300, that would be a mindblowing rate of 10%. It must have been somewhere in that range.
You may think that a chance of 1 in 100 or 1 in 10 isn't that high -- but we shouldn't take this probability in isolation. We should compare to other Americans, whether founding-stock whites, immigrants, other non-Christian groups (Hindus), etc. As far as I've heard, none of these other groups held outdoor celebrations in the wake of the two towers coming down.
The entire US population in 2000 was 282 million -- so perhaps there were a handful around the country who escaped notice, for a rate of maybe 1 in 10 million or 1 in 100 million? In other words, Muslims in Paterson were "only" about a million times more likely than the rest of us to openly celebrate the destruction of the World Trade Center.
This is all back-of-the-envelope stuff here, so maybe they'll turn out to be "only" 10,000 times more likely than the rest of us.
And 1 in 10 or 1 in 100 is not a "low" rate, for the kind of act we're talking about. Not that they inwardly felt neither grief nor excitement -- but outwardly cheering on the largest terrorist attack on America. Imagine a mosque in Paterson with 100 regular members -- then somewhere between 1 and 10 of these seemingly innocent regular religious attenders from the neighborhood would have revealed themselves to be traitors. That's the thanks we get for letting them into our country.
Even among those who did not celebrate openly, some fraction would have been sympathetic but lacked the nerve or felt enough shame not to dance in the streets during 9/11. It could be up to half or more of the Muslim population there who are bitterly hostile toward their host nation.
And even if they don't go on to blow up another airliner and skyscraper, those aren't the kind of people we want in our communities. They are incapable of integrating, and will corrode whatever sense of trust, norms, and togetherness we may have.
Not that there's a whole lot of trust and solidarity to destroy in New Jersey -- but opening the floodgates of immigration is only going to make it worse (see Robert Putnam's study on diversity weakening trust in communities). And certainly the rest of the country, where there are strong communities, does not need a single Muslim immigrant. And those who are already there may be hostile to their host community, and some may need to be kept an eye on.
All journalists are innumerate, so I don't expect them to understand the need to focus on a probability rather than a count, let alone how to work with fractions and make use of publicly available data. They get paid too much money to use their brain.
But what's really disgusting is how they're trying to whitewash the whole thing from history. Do your part and go search Lexis-Nexis to add to the growing list of reports of Muslims in America (especially New Jersey) celebrating on 9/11.
December 1, 2015
Movie theater experience less powerful with new seating style
When I caught Spectre this weekend, it was the first time I'd been to one of those movie theaters with Starbucks seating -- large comfy recliners in a variety of arrangements, some adjacent all the way down the row, some in a pair (like a loveseat with an optional armrest divider), and some singletons. Kind of like this:
Not a fan of the new seating style (but you already knew that).
The overly comfy recliners made my body feel like I'm at a friend's house watching a late-night movie on TV or VHS, kind of getting prepared to doze off. After a brief experiment with the recliner part up, I kept it down for the rest of the movie.
Overstuffed furniture also keeps you from ever getting that "edge of your seat" feeling. How are you supposed to resonate with the on-screen tension when you're sunken into a cushion-cloud? Worse when the chairs are highback and give you a nice comfy headrest to fall asleep against.
Aside from the construction of the seats, allowing some of the arrangement to be singleton seats and isolated loveseats weakened the feeling of all the audience being part of the same group (unless you were in the traditional row section). It didn't cancel it out, but being that spread-out does take away from the "all in the same boat" experience.
That, too, made it feel more like a teenage sleepover, more informal, where there's a couple people over here, a couple people over there, some others back over there. Not like a more formal and close-together seating arrangement for what's supposed to be a more group-bonding experience than a sleepover -- the pews in a church, the bleachers in a sports stadium.
Attending church services or a football game is not an ordinary experience, and does not take place in an ordinary setting. It's only fitting that the seating be outside of the ordinary as well. Going to the movies is supposed to be that way too -- taking place outside of the home, with seating suited to "audience attending a performance" rather than "group of folks just hanging around," where they're more focused on each other than on the movie.
In short, making the movie theater feel like home makes the experience feel less special, less powerful, and less memorable. It's not unlike the drive-in craze of the cocooning Midcentury. Cocooners just feel too awkward being out in public, so they make the owners of public places re-shape them to feel more like home.
The high points for watching movies as part of a superorganic audience were low points for cocooning behavior -- the 1920s and the 1980s. In the former time, it was the heyday of the "picture palace," while in the latter it was the "multiplex," both attempts at creating a larger-than-life spectacle of the place where we went to the movies.
Central to both types of theaters, or even the relatively more mundane one-screen theaters of the Midcentury, was the seating. Arranged in rows, enough upholstery on the seat and the back to make it comfortable without feeling comfy, backs high enough to support the shoulders but not a sleepy neck and head, shallow seats that everyone can feel on the edge of, and no damn cupholders on the arms.
Cupholders on a chair's arm does make it feel out of the ordinary, but not in the right way. It makes it seem like the purpose of going to the movie theater is to fill up on junk food, rather than to watch a performance. Going to the movies is supposed to stimulate your fight-or-flight system, not rest-and-digest.
While the overall architecture of the picture palaces may be superior, I actually prefer the spatial layout of the multiplex, which feels like a Gothic castle (or so I imagine) -- first a grand entrance where folks mill around, then a trek down one of several dark tunnel-like hallways, settling into one of many large private chambers for a shared spectacle with the lights off, and then when the movie's over retracing your path during the cognitive and emotional decompression. We need that winding-down experience after a good cathartic movie, not just walking straight out the exit door and emerging instantly back into the ordinary world.
How many other experiences, whether everyday or special, lead you through that kind of layout? If Netflix and Redbox kill off the multiplexes, we are going to lose the only place we have to navigate a dimly lit labyrinth in an enjoyable way.
Not a fan of the new seating style (but you already knew that).
The overly comfy recliners made my body feel like I'm at a friend's house watching a late-night movie on TV or VHS, kind of getting prepared to doze off. After a brief experiment with the recliner part up, I kept it down for the rest of the movie.
Overstuffed furniture also keeps you from ever getting that "edge of your seat" feeling. How are you supposed to resonate with the on-screen tension when you're sunken into a cushion-cloud? Worse when the chairs are highback and give you a nice comfy headrest to fall asleep against.
Aside from the construction of the seats, allowing some of the arrangement to be singleton seats and isolated loveseats weakened the feeling of all the audience being part of the same group (unless you were in the traditional row section). It didn't cancel it out, but being that spread-out does take away from the "all in the same boat" experience.
That, too, made it feel more like a teenage sleepover, more informal, where there's a couple people over here, a couple people over there, some others back over there. Not like a more formal and close-together seating arrangement for what's supposed to be a more group-bonding experience than a sleepover -- the pews in a church, the bleachers in a sports stadium.
Attending church services or a football game is not an ordinary experience, and does not take place in an ordinary setting. It's only fitting that the seating be outside of the ordinary as well. Going to the movies is supposed to be that way too -- taking place outside of the home, with seating suited to "audience attending a performance" rather than "group of folks just hanging around," where they're more focused on each other than on the movie.
In short, making the movie theater feel like home makes the experience feel less special, less powerful, and less memorable. It's not unlike the drive-in craze of the cocooning Midcentury. Cocooners just feel too awkward being out in public, so they make the owners of public places re-shape them to feel more like home.
The high points for watching movies as part of a superorganic audience were low points for cocooning behavior -- the 1920s and the 1980s. In the former time, it was the heyday of the "picture palace," while in the latter it was the "multiplex," both attempts at creating a larger-than-life spectacle of the place where we went to the movies.
Central to both types of theaters, or even the relatively more mundane one-screen theaters of the Midcentury, was the seating. Arranged in rows, enough upholstery on the seat and the back to make it comfortable without feeling comfy, backs high enough to support the shoulders but not a sleepy neck and head, shallow seats that everyone can feel on the edge of, and no damn cupholders on the arms.
Cupholders on a chair's arm does make it feel out of the ordinary, but not in the right way. It makes it seem like the purpose of going to the movie theater is to fill up on junk food, rather than to watch a performance. Going to the movies is supposed to stimulate your fight-or-flight system, not rest-and-digest.
While the overall architecture of the picture palaces may be superior, I actually prefer the spatial layout of the multiplex, which feels like a Gothic castle (or so I imagine) -- first a grand entrance where folks mill around, then a trek down one of several dark tunnel-like hallways, settling into one of many large private chambers for a shared spectacle with the lights off, and then when the movie's over retracing your path during the cognitive and emotional decompression. We need that winding-down experience after a good cathartic movie, not just walking straight out the exit door and emerging instantly back into the ordinary world.
How many other experiences, whether everyday or special, lead you through that kind of layout? If Netflix and Redbox kill off the multiplexes, we are going to lose the only place we have to navigate a dimly lit labyrinth in an enjoyable way.
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